Law Text Culture
Volume 4 Issue 1 In the Wake of Terra Nullius

Article 6

1998

Native title, fictions and 'convenient falsehoods'
G. Nettheim
University of New South Wales

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc

Recommended Citation
Nettheim, G., Native title, fictions and 'convenient falsehoods', Law Text Culture, 4, 1998, 70-80.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss1/6
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Native title, fictions and 'convenient falsehoods'
Abstract
The fiction of Australia as 'terra nullius' was officially discarded by the High Court of Australia in Mabo v
Queensland (No 2) (1992), so far as the preexisting rights to land of Indigenous Australians were
concerned.
But an alternative fiction continues to perform a similar role, and continues to influence public discourse.
It, too, would justify the continuing displacement of what may remain of Indigenous peoples' property
rights. The fiction is usually expressed in the catchphrase 'land management is a prerogative of the
States'. This fiction is given ample accommodation in the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 ('the NTAB').
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Native Title, Fictions and 'Convenient Falsehoods'
Garth Nettheim

lntrodudion

The fiction of Australia as 'terra nullius' was officially discarded by the High
Court of Australia in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992), so far as the preexisting rights to land of Indigenous Australians were concerned.
But an alternative fiction continues to perform a similar role, and continues to
influence public discourse. It, too, would justify the continuing displacement of
what may remain of Indigenous peoples' property rights. The fiction is usually
expressed in the catchphrase 'land management is a prerogative of the States'.
This fiction is given ample accommodation in the Native Title Amendment Bill
1997 ('the NTAB').
The Bill has been passed by the House of Representatives but amended by the
Senate to an extent which the Lower House resolved, on 6th December 1997,
was unacceptable. The Bill will be re-introduced in March 1998. The possible
resolution of any continuing disagreement between the House could take the
form of a double dissolution election in which native title would be an
important issue.
On Sunday, 30th November 1997, the Prime Minister, in a televised address to
the nation argued that the Senate should enact his Government's NTAB. At the
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same time, he stressed 'the fulsome commitment of my Government to the
process of reconciliation'. He stressed, also, that 'we must continue our efforts
to improve their [Indigenous Australians'] health, their housing, their
employment and their education opportunities'.
The message remains unaltered since colonial times. Professor Henry Reynolds
in The Law of the Land writes about responses in the Australian colonies to
Imperial concerns for Aboriginal people. Such responses included
supporting such purely humanitarian aspects as protection of life and tightfisted charity while rejecting the central emphasis on legal equality and land
rights. ". Aborigines could have 'protection', they couldn't have land (Reynolds
1987: 151).

Terra Nullius
For over two centuries, one fiction was said to oppose any legal
acknowledgement of the pre-existing land rights of Indigenous Australians.
That was expressed in the phrase 'terra nullius' -land belonging to no one.
Reynolds has demonstrated how this notion became applied to Australia on the
basis of misinformation and surmise. In The Law of the Land he sets out the
testimony of Sir Joseph Banks to the House of Commons Committee on
Transportation in 1785 (Reynolds 1987: 31-32, 53-54). He comments: 'It all
would have been so easy if Banks had been right - that apart from the coastal
fringe Australia was uninhabited, literally a terra nullius. But he wasn't.'
(Reynolds 1987: 32).
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Yet the settlement of the eastern part of the continent proceeded on the
assumption that Banks had been right.
Some forty to fifty years later, when the Colonial Office in Britain tried to put
things to rights, it achieved some partial success in requiring that pastoral
leases should co-exist with Aboriginal rights of access to land, at least in the
newer colonies of Western Australia and South Australia and what is now the
Northern Territory. It proved more difficult to achieve explicit legal recognition
of this proposition in the older, eastern colonies. Settlement had proceeded on
the basis that there was simply no need to take account of Aboriginal rights in
relation to land. This fiction was too convenient to be foregone. In Coe v.
Commonwealth (1979) , the late Justice Murphy said of the proposition (as
restated in a Privy Council decision) that it 'may be regarded as having been
made in ignorance, or as a convenient falsehood to justify the taking of
Aborigines' land' (412).
And so the fiction survived, despite the common law's recognition of 'native
title' in the USA from as early as the 1820s, and its recognition in other lands
settled by the British.
It was only in 1971 that there was a direct legal challenge to the doctrine, in the

first court action brought by Indigenous Australians to assert their ownership of
land: Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971). Justice Blackburn of the Northern
Territory Supreme Court felt bound to read the Australian common law
position in accordance with dicta in several earlier appellate decisions for
Australia, to the effect that Australian law did not recognise pre-existing
Indigenous land rights. It was only in 1992 that the High Court ofAustralia had
the opportunity to rule on the matter. In Mabo (No.2), six of the seven Justices
ruled that the common law of Australia, like the common law in other
countries, did accommodate 'native title', But they also held that the survival of
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native title was subject to the possibility of extinguishment by government acts
which are clearly inconsistent with the continued exercise of such rights and
interests. This effectively legitimated two centuries of non-Indigenous land
grants. (There remained a question as to titles granted since commencement of
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) -one function of the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth) was to validate such 'past acts').
The fiction of 'terra nullius' had thus been discarded in relation to Indigenous
peoples' property rights though it remained intact in relation to their
'sovereignty' rights. (Reynolds, 19%)

Land Management
By this time, however, a newer legal catchcry had emerged, reflected in the oftrepeated mantra that 'land management' is a prerogative of the Australian
States, as against any national power which might be claimed by the
Commonwealth Parliament.
Much was heard of the proposition during 1993, in the 'debate' that followed
the Mabo decision in the lead up to enactment of the Native Title Act 1993
(Cth) ('the NTA'). At the time the argument nearly prevailed, but, ultimately,
found only limited scope in the NTA.
It emerged again, after the 1996 Wik decision. This time it found a Coalition
Government more inclined to accept the proposition. This proposition is the
central, informing theme of the NTAB.
Where did this notion come from?
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We can trace it back - together with its connection to the fiction of terra nullius
- to the crucial few years between Cook's exploration of the eastern coast of
Australia in 1770 and Phillip's arrival in 1778 with 'The First Fleet'. The
Admiralty's instructions to Cook, issued in 1768, were quite specific:
'You are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of convenient
situations in the country ... or, if you find the country uninhabited take
possession .. as first discoverers and possessors.' (McRae, Nettheim &
Beacroft 1997: 33)
Cook proceeded in accordance with the latter part of his instructions. By
contrast, Phillip's instructions in relation to natives were merely to 'conciliate
their affections'. And he was authorised to make grants of land. (McRae,
Nettheim & Beacroft 1997: 33)
Indeed, the granting of land became a core objective in the establishment of
the colony at Port Jackson and the later colonial settlements. As the penal
settlements were supplemented by immigration and free settlers the revenue
base for the colonies came to depend critically on the sale of land. This was
seen necessarily to involve the dispossession and marginalisation of the
Indigenous peoples.
This has been a key theme in the development ofAustralia. As Justice Brennan
expressed it in Mabo (No 2): 'Their dispossession underwrote the development
ofthe nation' (69).
During the nineteenth century this imperative withstood the best endeavours
of the Imperial Government to protect the interests of Aborigines (Reynolds
1987).
At the end of the nineteenth century, it withstood the move to nation-building
in the new Federation. In comparable federations, the Constitution of the
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United States ofAmerica, and the British North America Act of 1867 for Canada,
both conferred on the federal legislatures the power and responsibility for
Indigenous peoples. By contrast, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Australia expressly preserved to the federating colonies (the States) the
legislative power with respect to the people of 'the Aboriginal race in any State'.
In 1967 the electors supported a referendum to delete this exception from 'the
race power' in the Constitution s 51 (xxvi). But the effect was to give the
Federal Parliament a concurrent power with the States rather than an exclusive
power.
By 1988, the bicentenary of British settlement, experience had been such as to
support the proposition, articulated by Father Frank Brennan and Professor
James Crawford, that there is 'a hidden Constitution' under which
Commonwealth power has 'continued to be limited and residual' (Brennan and
Crawford 1990: 63-64).
Indeed, State (and industry) resistance had been effective in 1984 to block the
Hawke Government's proposals for national land rights legislation (Stokes
1987). In 1993, by contrast, the NTA was pushed through Parliament by the
Keating Government against the determined opposition of States, particularly
Western Australia. The mantra that 'land management is a State prerogative'
was heard loud and often. Several States and Territories attempted 'go it alone'
legislation to restore the prior situation of the 'defeasibility' of native title. Only
Western Australia persevered to the extent of Constitutional 'showdown'. In
Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995), the High Court ruled,
unanimously, that the State legislation was invalid. It had purported to
extinguish native title and substitute statutory rights of traditional usage which
would be 'administratively defeasible'.
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This goal of the State was, in effect, to replace the majority decision in Mabo
(No.2) with Justice Dawson's dissenting view that Aboriginal rights amounted
to nothing more than permissive occupancy. This goal could not be achieved in
the face of overriding Commonwealth legislation - the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 and the NfA.
The goal of restoring 'land management' - and Aboriginal dispossession - to its
rightful place at the centre of State politics could only be achieved by gaining
access to Commonwealth legislative power.
That opportunity arose with the March 1996 election of the Howard Coalition
Government. By June 1996, the Government published the NTAB. Further
provisions were publicised in October 1996. But the Wik decision in December
1996 provided the pretext for the Government to proclaim, in effect, a national
emergency such as to justify a drastic recasting of the NfA.
The major thrust of the Ten Point Plan and the NTAB is to restore to State and
Territory governments their colonial-era prerogative of promoting the
development of land, and where deemed necessary, displacing any native title
holders. It is less national legislation than 'States' rights' legislation.
Some of the principles features of the NTAB are noted:
•

Anew definition of 'extinguish' provides that any extinguishment of native
title is permanent so that native title may not revive if the extinguishing
event ceases to operate. This is almost certainly inconsistent with the
common law position and with the reasoning of the majority of the High
Court in the Wik decision.

•

The Bill establishes a category of 'previous exclusive possession acts' dating
back, conceivably, as far as 1788. States and Territories may 'confirm' that
such acts have permanently extinguished native title. Many of the 'acts'
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would not, on closer analysis, have been so inconsistent with native title as
to extinguish it for all time.
•

The Bill provides for a blanket validation of 'intermediate period acts' by
governments in the period from the commencement of the NFA (l January
1994) to the date of the Wik decision (23 December 1996). These 'acts'
that fall within Category A (the list is similar to the list of 'previous
exclusive possession acts') permanently extinguish native title.

•

For 'future acts' the Bill provides for the validity of various 'acts' by
governments on land subject to native title whether or not such acts might
also be done in relation to land held under freehold title. This is a
departure from the 'freehold test' in the NTA.

•

In particular, provision is made for a widely expanded range of 'primary
production' activities to be conducted on (or off) non-exclusive agricultural
or pastoral leases, notwithstanding any effects on native title.

•

There are provisions which would authorise the upgrading of nonexclusive pastoral or agricultural leases so as to confer exclusive
possession, or to extend term leases to perpetual leases, or to convert
leasehold to freehold titles, with consequent effects on any native title.

•

Governments will be authorised to grant interests in water or 'living
aquatic resources' or airspace without regard to native title rights.

•

Governments will also be authorised to permit, on native title land, a
lengthy list of services to the public.

•

The 'right to negotiate' currently applies to future act proposals to grant,
vary or extend mining interests, or to compulsorily acquire land for the
benefit of others. It is to be substantially eliminated, in some cases by
deference to State!ferritory processes. It will not apply separately to
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mining exploration and extraction. It will not apply in the inter-tidal zone.
It will not apply in towns or cities. And it can be side-stepped altogether at
the discretion of a Minister.

•

Before the 'right to negotiate' and some other processes apply at all, native
title holders will have to satisfy a stringent and retroactive registration test.

•

Provisions for negotiated Indigenous Land Use Agreements would be
valuable additions to the current NTA, but will have reduced value when
the 'right to negotiate' is so substantially undermined.

•

All applications will be lodged with the Federal Court rather than the
National Native Title Tribunal. The processes are, generally, to be more
narrowly-confined and legalistic.

•

A six year 'sunset clause' is to be imposed on applications for
determinations of native title and/or compensation.

• Provisions

enhance the responsibilities of Representative
AboriginallTorres Strait Islander bodies would also be useful. However the
Commonwealth Minister will undertake a process of recognising all
representative bodies and the areas for which they are to function.
to
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Conclusion

The terra nullius fiction cannot be revived. But it served its purpose for over
two centuries and remains deeply embedded in the psyche of State and
Territory politicians and bureaucrats. Its place has been taken by
conceptualising any moves to recognise the relationship of Indigenous
Australians to their land and waters as running counter to the prerogative and
imperatives of 'land management'.
What is perhaps surprising is that this way of perceiving the issue has been
subject to such limited challenge. The land is treated merely as a unit in the
economic system, as real estate whose sole purpose is to generate wealth. The
vision of the land as timeless, as fragile, as the source of life, spirituality and
culture, remains beyond the imagination. Even the more limited human rights
perspective, that Indigenous peoples are entitled to their property rights on a
non-discriminatory basis, remains beyond the comprehension of too many
Australians.
The fiction of terra nullius is dead. But the colonial era attitudes that
supported it for over two centuries remain as potent today as they were in the
1830s.
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